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Abstract 
 
We use a vertical product differentiation model under partial market coverage to study 
the social welfare optimum and duopoly equilibrium when convex costs of quality 
provision are either fixed or variable in terms of production. We show that, under fixed 
costs, at the social welfare optimum only one quality variant of the good is provided, 
while both variants are optimal under variable costs. In the duopoly equilibrium the 
quality spread is too wide under variable costs, but too narrow under fixed costs, relative 
to the social optimum. Finally, in both the fixed and variable cost cases, average quality 
provided by the duopoly equilibrium is too low from the perspective of a social welfare 
maximizer. 
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1. Introduction  
 
A well-established result in vertical product differentiation models is that a duopoly 
consisting of high and low quality firms leads to product quality dispersion that is too 
high and average levels of quality that are too low, relative to the socially optimal 
outcome (see Crampes and Hollander 1995).  This result has been established under the 
assumption that markets are fully covered, i.e., that all consumers purchase positive 
quantities of the good in question. A consequence of full market coverage is that, even 
though duopoly qualities differ from the socially optimal ones, the quantities produced by 
the firms are always equivalent. 
The case of a partially covered duopoly is more appealing, in that it allows for 
some consumers who do not purchase from either firm but could potentially enter the 
market. In this case, if the duopoly and socially optimal outcomes differ, then not only 
the qualities but also the quantities differ. In the voluminous literature on partial market 
coverage, the social welfare outcome has mainly remained an open issue.  
Our work fills an important gap in this literature.  We characterize the properties 
of socially optimal qualities and solve for the divergence between duopoly and social 
outcomes when a market is partially covered. Unlike other work, we analyze and 
compare both cases of fixed and variable costs of production.1 For variable costs we 
characterize the social optimum in the same way that Crampes and Hollander (1995) do 
for the fully covered market case. Ecchia et al. (2002) have argued that, under fixed costs, 
it is optimal to provide just one quality level. However, they do not study the problem of 
socially optimal price setting, nor do they show how the fixed cost case may differ from 
the variable cost case. Motta (1993) allows for both variable and fixed costs with partial 
market coverage but does not explicitly solve for the socially optimal outcome. Instead he  
uses numerical illustrations to compare consumer surpluses in the different equilibria.   
Like most existing product differentiation models, we assume consumers derive 
utility from observed quality of products.  Indeed, we retain this assumption because we 
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seek to provide closure on the modeling of one class of product differentiation models 
under the assumption of partial market coverage. Also like other work, our duopoly 
outcome is solved as the subgame perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game.  Firms 
maximize profits by first competing in qualities and then competing in prices.  
Our characterization of the socially optimal outcome provides several new 
findings.  Unlike in the duopoly equilibrium, it is socially optimal in the fixed cost case to 
provide only the high quality variant of a good, while the profit maximizing duopoly 
provides two variants. Moreover, provision of the socially optimal quality level is higher 
than the high quality variant provided by the market and, therefore, average quality 
provided by the market is lower than the socially optimal average quality. The social 
planner in this case is free to charge either a zero or positive price, and to service either 
some or all of the consumers in the market.  
Under the assumption of variable costs the high quality firm in a duopoly will 
have higher profits but lower market share than the low quality firm. As a new result we 
show that the spread of product quality observed under a profit maximizing duopoly is 
too high relative to the socially optimal outcome. At the socially optimal outcome, both 
firms produce the same amounts, and total output is greater than with the duopoly 
outcome.  
At the social optimum the major difference between fixed and variable cost cases 
is that, under fixed costs, only one product variant is provided, while both variants are 
optimal under variable costs.  In duopoly equilibrium the quality spread is too wide under 
variable costs, while it is too narrow under fixed costs. Average product quality in both 
cases is too low compared to the socially optimal equilibrium. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents a basic duopoly model and the profit 
maximizing solution with partial market coverage for both fixed and variable costs of 
production. In Section 3 we compare the socially optimal and profit -maximizing 
qualities.  Finally, we provide a brief conclusion. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 Under the assumption of fixed costs, Ronnen (1991) considers minimum quality standards 
without analyzing the socially optimal quality provision. Lambertini (1996), in turn, considers the 
variable cost case but does not examine the socially optimal outcome.   
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2. A Duopoly Model of Vertical Product Differentiation with Partial 
Market Coverage 
 
Under an assumption of partial market coverage, each consumer is typically assumed to 
purchase either one unit of the good or nothing.  Let a consumer have a utility function u  
(see Tirole 1988, pp 96-97, 296-298), 
 
kk psu -= q ,         (1) 
 
where ks  and kp  are the quality and price of the kth good.
2 In (1), q  represents the 
consumer’s taste parameter, so that the consumer derives a surplus equal to kk ps -q  
from a good of quality ks and price kp . Assume there are two possible qualities of goods 
produced by two types of firms, k = H (high quality) and k = L (low quality). A standard 
assumption is that the consumers’ taste parameters are uniformally distributed over 
qualities on a definite interval, [ ]qqq ,Î  (see e.g. Motta 1993, or Cremer and Thisse 
1999).  
We assume that the high and low quality firms have quadratic and convex cost 
functions for providing quality,  
 
LHbssc kkk ,kfor    2
1
)( 2 == .       (2) 
 
 Because consumers can purchase either one unit or nothing, the consumer who is 
indifferent between high and low quality goods has a threshold taste parameter defined 
by 
LH
LH
ss
pp
-
-
=qˆ . Under partial market coverage, some consumers do not enter the 
market. More specifically, the lowest marginal willingness to pay value can be defined 
for the consumer who is indifferent between buying and not buying the good, i.e., 
                                                               
2 Throughout the paper, derivatives of functions with one argument will be denoted by primes, 
while partial derivatives will be denoted by subscripts of functions with many arguments.  
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L
Lc
s
p
=q . Recalling the uniform distribution of consumer types, the demands for high 
and low quality products then become qq ˆ-=Hq  and 
c
Lq qq -= ˆ , where Hq  and Lq  
are the number of consumers purchasing from the low and high quality firm, respectively.  
Based on the above assumptions, we will focus on cases where the costs of 
providing quality are either fixed or variable with respect to output. The assumption of 
fixed costs has been widely applied in the literature. Kuhn (2000) recently argued that the 
variable cost case might be more appealing than the fixed cost case, because it avoids an 
implausible feature of fixed costs.  This is that the high quality firm has both higher 
profits and a larger market share in equilibrium. 3 In conformity with observations from 
practice, our variable cost case results in an equilibrium where the profits of the high 
quality firm are higher that those of the low quality firm.  However, the market share of 
the high quality firm is lower than the low quality firm. 
 
2.1 Price and Quality Games: Fixed costs 
 
The analysis of duopoly competition under fixed costs of production was originally 
provided by Ronnen (1991). In what follows we develop the features of his model very 
briefly. When the cost of quality provision is fixed in terms of qua ntity produced, then 
given the demands kq and the cost function in (2), the profit functions of the high and low 
quality firm are: 
 
)( kkkkk scqp -=p , for LHk ,= .           (3) 
 
There are then two stages of the duopoly game: quality provision (stage 1), and 
price competition conditional on quality provided (stage 2). Firms move simultaneously 
in each stage. 4 We can solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. This 
equilibrium relies, as usual, on commitment by firms in terms of quality. In the second 
                                                               
3 This result was originally discovered by Lehmann-Grube (1997). He also showed that it holds 
irrespective of whether the firms choose their qualities simultaneously or sequentially.  
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stage, firms choose prices given the costs of quality production. From the first -order 
conditions, 0=¶¶ H
H pp  and 0=¶¶ L
L pp , we can solve for the optimal prices and 
their difference as follows, 
 
LH
LHH
H ss
sssp
-
-=*
4
)(2 q
;  
LH
LHL
L ss
sssp
-
-=*
4
)( q
 ; 
LH
LHLH
LH ss
sssspp
-
--=-
4
))(2(** q   (4) 
 
Thus, duopoly prices depend on the quality differences and the upper bound of the 
consumer taste distribution. The lower bound of the taste distribution does not matter 
here, because in partially covered markets the lowest critical value of marginal 
willingness to pay is endogenous.  
Inserting the above prices into the respective profit functions yields the indirect 
profit functions for each firm’s choice of quality, 
 
2
2
22
2
1
)4(
)(4
H
LH
LHH
H bsss
sss -
+-
-=* qp ;  22
2
2
1
)4(
)(
L
LH
LLHH
L bsss
ssss -
+-
-=* qp . (5) 
 
Differentiating equations in (5) with respect to qualities gives, 
 
0
)4(
)(84
)4(
)(32
2
222
3
22
=-
+-
-++
+-
-=
¶
¶
H
LH
LHHH
LH
LHH
H
H bs
ss
ssss
ss
sss
s
qqqp
   (6a) 
0
)4(
)(
)4(
)(2
2
22
3
2
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+-
--+
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-=
¶
¶
L
LH
LHLHH
LH
LHLH
L
L bs
ss
sssss
ss
ssss
s
qqqp
  (6b) 
 
Solving these first -order conditions for high and low quality and their difference with 
Mathematica yields,  
 
b
sH
2253311.0 q=* ;
b
sL
20482383.0 q=* ;
b
ss LH
22050727.0 q=- ** .   (7) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 In fact, Lambertini (1996) has shown that the simultaneous move game is the only pure strategy 
equilibrium possible for a partial market coverage model with variable costs of producing quality.   
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Thus, the equilibrium duopoly qualities and the quality difference between firms depend 
positively on the square of the upper bound of taste distribution, 2q , and negatively on 
the marginal cost parameter of quality provision b.  
Using these optimal qualities, we can now solve for the prices and demands of 
both quality variants as a function of exogenous parameters: 
b
pH
3107662.0 q=* ; 
b
pL
3010251.0 q
=* ; q524994.0=*Hq ; q262497.0=
*
Lq . The overall demand, which 
indicates the resulting coverage in the market, is therefore given by 
q787491.0=+ ** LH qq . If we now normalize 1=q  (and 0=q ), then we can conclude 
that about 79% of consumers enter the market and buy one of the two quality variants.  
Because the high quality firm charges a higher price and faces a larger demand, it has 
higher profits and greater market share than the low quality firm.  This can also be seen 
from the profit solutions for high and low quality firms, 
bH
40244386.0 q
p =  and 
bL
400152741.0 qp = . As we shall see, this result must be modified for the case of 
variable costs of production.  
 
2.2 Price and Quality Games: Variable costs 
 
Next we assume the costs of providing quality are variable in terms of output. Under this 
assumption, and given the demands kq  and the cost function in (2), the profit functions 
for each firm are written,  
 
[ ] kkkkk qscp )(-=p , for LHk ,= .      (8) 
 
As before, in the second stage firms choose prices given the costs of quality production. 
From the first-order conditions, 0=¶¶ H
H pp  and 0=¶¶ L
L pp , we can solve for 
optimal prices, 
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[ ]
LH
LHHLHH
H ss
ssbssss
p
-
++-
=*
4
))2/1(()(2 22q
    (9a) 
[ ]
LH
LHHLHL
L ss
ssbssss
p
-
++-
=*
4
))2/1(()( 22q
.       (9b) 
        
LH
LHHLHLH
LH ss
ssbsssss
pp
-
-+--
=-
4
)()2/1())(2( 22** q    (9c) 
 
Again, duopoly prices and their difference depend on quality differences and on the upper 
bound of the consumer taste distribution.  
Substituting these optimal prices into the profit functions, we can express indirect 
profits in terms of quality as, 
 
[ ]
222
222
)4(4
)2(4)(
LH
LHLHH
H ss
ssbsss
+-
++--=* qp          (10a) 
[ ]
222
2
*
)4(4
)(2)(
LH
LHLHHL
L ss
ssbssss
+-
-+-= qp .         (10b) 
 
Optimal second stage qualities then follow from the first-order conditions, 
 
[ ]
0
)4(4
)252224()234(4
0
3
3223222
=
-
-+--+--W
Û=
¶
¶ *
LH
LLHLHHLLHH
H
H
ss
ssssssbssss
s
qp
(11a)
[ ]
0
)4(4
)2154)(()74(2
0
3
222
=
-
+--+-L
Û=
¶
¶ *
LH
LLHHLHLHH
L
L
ss
ssssssbsss
s
qp
,   (11b) 
 
where [ ])2(4 LHH ssbs ++-=W q  and [ ])(2 2 LHH ssbs ++=L q . 
 
Given the complexity of the first-order conditions, solving for the actual 
equilibrium qualities is a bit laborious. Without loss of generality we  define LH dss =  for 
some 1>d , where d indicates the degree of product differentiation between firms 
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expressed in terms of the quality spread between high and low quality firms. Note that 
this assumption does not predetermine the results presented later concerning differences 
between socially optimal and duopoly outcomes. It simply implies that the high quality 
firm produces higher quality than the low quality firm, which is always the case in these 
models. 
Using LH dss = and solving (11a) - (11b) with Mathematica, we obtain the 
following equilibrium qualities and their difference, 
 
b
sH
28195.0 q
=* ; 
b
sL
23987.0 q
=* , 
b
ss LH
24208.0 q
=- ** .   (12) 
 
Equilibrium duopoly qualities and the degree of quality differentiation are positive 
functions of the upper bound of the square of the taste distribution, 2q , and a negative 
function of the marginal cost parameter of quality provision, b. This result is qualitatively 
similar to those found in full market coverage models. Note also that the quality 
difference is higher with variable costs compared to the fixed cost case.  
This last finding can be interpreted as follows. Under fixed costs, the costs of 
producing both quality variants of the good in the second stage are zero (even though the 
costs of providing quality differ), but they are strictly positive under variable costs. Thus 
under variable costs of production, quality competition between the firms is tighter 
because the firms obtain greater rents from differentiating compared to the fixed cost 
case.   
Finally, using the optimal qualities above, we can solve the previous first-order 
conditions for equilibrium prices and demands: 
b
pH
2453313.0 q
=* ; 
b
pL
215002.0 q
=* ; 
q279245.0=*Hq ; q344503.0=
*
Lq . Interestingly, for our case of variable costs of 
production, we find that the high quality firm has higher profits but lower market share 
than the low quality firm. The overall demand (i.e., coverage) in the market is given by 
q623748.0=+ ** LH qq . Thus, under variable costs, overall market coverage is smaller than 
in the case of fixed costs.  This is a natural result since production costs are now positive 
and the quality spread is wider, which serves to relax price competition between firms 
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and allows the firms to charge higher prices. The firms’ indirect profit functions can now 
be solved to obtain 
b
H
30328129.0~ qp = ; 
b
L
3024298.0~ qp = . 
 
3. Socially Optimal versus Profit-Maximizing Quality Decisions 
 
Now we turn to the main part of our paper, i.e., the determination of the socially optimal 
qualities and their relationship with the equilibrium duopoly qualities under both 
assumptions of fixed and variable cost of production. The socially optimal levels of 
quality are those that maximize a social welfare function, which is the sum of surplus to 
consumers net of costs to produce high and low quality goods,  
 
 qqqq
q
q
q
q
dbssdbssSW LLHH
c
)
2
1
()
2
1
( 2
ˆ
2
ˆ
-+-= òò .    (13) 
 
3.1 Fixed Costs and the Socially Optimal Qualities 
 
We start by analyzing the properties of the first-best solution under fixed costs. The 
social planner simultaneously chooses prices and qualities to maximize (13). The planner 
accounts for the critical taste parameter separating consumers of high and low quality 
variants, while keeping it open whether it is socially optimal to serve the whole market or 
not. Thus, the planner uses the following critical values of the taste parameter 
  
LH
LH
ss
pp
-
-=qˆ ;  qq =c .         (14) 
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Differentiating first the social welfare function (13) with respect to high and low 
quality prices gives LH pp = .
5 Using this in the social welfare function and differentiating 
it with respect to high and low qualities yields, 
 
0)2(
2
1 2 =-= Hs bsSW H q , 0)2(2
1 2 =--= Ls bsSW L q .    (15) 
 
Solving for optimal high quality yields 
b
swH 2
2q
= .  Note however that 0<
Ls
SW , implying 
that production of low quality variant is zero.  Thus, it is socially optimal to provide just 
one quality variant (high quality), 
b
sw
2
2q= , as pointed out by Ecchia et al. (2002).  
Consider now the relationships between socially optimal qualities and duopoly 
qualities (which has been characterized in equation 7), 
 
0246689.0
2
* <-=-
b
ss wHH
q
                   (16a) 
0048238.0
2
* >=-
b
ss wLL
q
         (16b) 
0
24669.0 2
<-=-*
b
ss waa
q
,         (16c) 
 
where the subscript ‘a’ refers to average quality. Clearly, a duopoly provides too little 
high quality and too much low quality goods.  This implies that profit maximization 
results in a quality dispersion that is socially sub-optimal. Moreover, the average quality 
provided by the market is too low from the social planner’s perspective.  We summarize 
these findings in: 
 
                                                               
5 The first-order conditions for the prices of the high and low variants are 
0=
-
+
-
-=
LH
L
LH
H
p ss
p
ss
p
SW
H
, 0=
-
-
-
=
LH
L
LH
H
p ss
p
ss
p
SW
L
. 
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Proposition 1: Under fixed costs of production, the socially optimal outcome involves 
production of only the high quality variant.  Compared to the socially optimal outcome, 
the profit maximizing duopoly provides too little high quality and too much low quality.  
 
Using the socially optimal quality, we can also solve for the socially optimal 
price. Inserting optimal qualities into the first-order conditions for prices would imply 
that the optimal price is zero, because, when quality is given, the cost of commodity 
production is zero. There are several possible ways to solve for the optimal prices.  First, 
the social planner could offer the high quality commodity to consumers at a zero price, 
given that investment in quality is independent of the commodity’s price level, and 
investment as such represents a sunk cost.  The second way is to assume that society 
charges a positive price such that either some subset or all of consumers purchase the 
commodity.  The latter price can be determined from the indifference relation between 
buying and not buying for the consumer having the lowest preference for quality. By 
inserting the socially optimal quality into this indifference relationship, we have 
0=- ps swq .  Recall that we solved for the socially optimal quality such that 
b
sw
2
2q
= . 
Using this yields the following socially optimal price, 
b
p w
2
2qq= . Under this price, 
demand for the commodity is simply given by qq -=swfq , so that relative to the 
duopoly equilibrium, the socially optimal solution with this pricing strategy yields 21% 
higher demand for the good (see our earlier analysis of duopoly in Section 2.1). 
 
3.2 Variable Costs and the Socially Optimal Qualities 
 
Next we compare the equilibrium duopoly solution with the socially optimal one in the 
case of variable costs of production. Unlike with fixed costs of production, the  
assumption of variable production costs allows the social welfare maximizer to offer 
products at a nonzero marginal cost. Therefore, replacing duopoly prices by the marginal 
costs of quality provision in the critical taste parameters qˆ  and cq , we can define new 
threshold critical taste parameters for the upper and lower bounds of the taste distribution, 
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   )(
2
1ˆ
LH ssb +=q ; L
C bs
2
1
=q .   (20) 
 
 
Using equation (20) and differentiating the social welfare function (13) with respect to 
the qualities Hs  and Ls  then gives the following first-order conditions,  
 
  ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-=ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-Û= HHs bsbsSW H q
qqq ˆ
2
ˆ
2
0
22
,   (21a) 
           
  
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
-=ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-Û= L
C
C
Ls bsbsSW L q
q
q
q
2
ˆ
2
ˆ
0
22
.   (21b) 
 
The socially optimal qualities can then be solved from (21a) and (21b) to obtain, 
 
 
b
swH 5
4 2q
= , 
b
swL 5
2 2q
=  and 
b
ss wL
w
H 5
2 2q
=- .   (22) 
 
Like the quality difference in the profit maximizing duopoly case, the socially optimal 
quality difference depends positively on the square upper bound of the taste distribution, 
q  and negatively on the marginal cost parameter of quality provision b.  
As for the relationship between socially optimal qualities in the duopoly and 
social welfare maximization cases, we obtain (using equation 12), 
 
   00195.0
2
* >=-
b
ss wHH
q ,    (23a) 
   0
087.0 2* <-=-
b
ss wLL
q
.    (23b) 
 
The magnitude of these expressions depends on the size of the squared upper bound of 
the taste distribution, which indicates how many consumers can potentially be captured 
by differentiating product qualities. Unlike in the case of fixed costs, the profit-
maximizing duopoly produces too much high quality and too little low quality than 
 15 
would the social planner. Further, if we compare quality differences across the outcomes, 
we see that profit maximization gives a quality dispersion that is too wide, i.e.,  
 
 ( ) 0
5
140.0)(
2
** <-=---
b
ssss LH
w
L
w
H
q
.  (23c) 
 
This implies that, in order to relax price competition, firms will behave in a manner that 
increases the spread of quality dispersion too much by maximizing profits. Such  
behavior decreases social welfare.  We can summarize these findings in: 
 
Proposition 2: Under variable costs of production, the socially optimal outcome involves 
provision of both high and low quality variants. Compared to the socially optimal 
outcome, the profit maximizing duopoly provides too much high quality and too little low 
quality. 
 
Next, we solve the demands for qualities in the socially optimal outcome. Using 
(12) in (9a) and (9b) and accounting for the definition of demands yields 
q4.0== wL
w
H qq .  Hence, the high and low quality firms will have demand of equal size 
at the social welfare optimum. The difference between total demand in the socially 
optimal and duopoly outcomes are given by: 0176252.0)()( >=+-+ ** qLH
w
L
w
H qqqq , 
implying that production of each variety and market coverage are both too small under 
the duopoly.  Intuitively, the duopoly restricts production in order to charge prices higher 
than marginal production costs.   This is strikingly different from the well-known result 
derived in fully covered markets, which states that the size of the economy’s production 
of quality is equal under duopoly and socially optimal outcomes.  Our new finding may 
have important policy implications for achieving efficient levels of quality in markets.  
Finally, it is interesting to compare the features of socially optimal quality 
provision under fixed and variables costs. The major difference between these two cases 
is as follows: under fixed costs we showed that only one quality variant of the good is 
provided.  Both variants are optimal under variable costs, and we can show that provision 
of the high quality variant is greater than in the case of fixed production costs. In the 
duopoly equilibrium, we also showed that the quality spread is too wide under variable 
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costs, but it is too narrow under fixed costs of production.  In both the fixed and variable 
cost cases, average quality is too low from the perspective of the social welfare 
maximizer. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We have used a vertical product differentiation model under the assumption of partial 
market coverage to characterize the social welfare and profit maximizing duopoly 
outcomes, in terms of quality provision and quantities produced.  We consider these 
under both variable and fixed convex costs of product ion.   
Under an assumption of fixed costs, the high quality firm has higher profits and 
greater market share than the low quality firm. Unlike in the duopoly equilibrium, 
however, we demonstrated, as has been pointed out in Ecchia et al. (2002), that it is  
socially optimal to provide the high quality commodity and set low quality production to 
zero at the social optimum. We also demonstrated that production of high quality at the 
social optimum is higher than that provided by the market, and therefore the average 
quality provided by the market is lower than at the social optimum.  As production is 
costless and investment in quality is lump sum, the planner may be free to set a zero or 
positive price, and to serve either all or part of the market.  
Under an assumption of variable costs, we also find a new result that the spread of 
product quality in the profit maximization duopoly outcome is too high relative to the 
social welfare maximizing outcome. At the social welfare optimum, overall output is 
greater than the output produced under the duopoly.   
At the social optimum there are two major differences between fixed cost and 
variable cost assumptions.  First, under fixed costs only one variant of quality is 
provided, while both variants are optimal under variable costs.  Second, provision of high 
quality is greater under variable costs of production. Comparing social welfare 
maximizing and duopoly outcomes, we also show that the product differentiation spread 
is too wide under a variable cost assumption, but it is too narrow under fixed costs.  
Average quality in both variable and fixed cost duopoly cases is too low from a social 
planner’s perspective.   
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